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In 1981, in my Animal Right~ an~ HI.lllBJl
 
Morality, [1] I gained the perhaps dubious
 
distinction of attempting to rouse the Aris­

totelian concept of teJ.:os from the dogmatic
 
slumber in which it had long lain, attended
 
to only by Scholastic philosophers. It ap­

pearedto me (and still does) that the notion
 
of telos provides a sound basis from which to
 
deduce the rights of animals of different
 
species, even as human rights have been based
 
in plausible hypotheses about hl.lllBJl nature.
 
In so far as different kinds of animals are
 
built in different sorts of ways for differ­

ent sorts of things and in so far as these
 
differences are rooted in biological, gene­

tically based, empirically ascertainable,
 
environmentally expressed "blueprints," I saw
 
nothing problematic about the concept of
 
telos that would not also trouble both the
 
ordinary and the scientific notions of spe­

cies, or perhaps, sub-species, depending upon
 
what one takes as a basic unit of classifica­
tion. Both cOIllllOn sense and mcx:1ern biology, 
after all, note that "fish gotta swim and 
birds gotta fly," as Professor Harlan Miller 
put it in reviewing my book. Furthenrore, as 
I argued later, once one had leaped positiv­
istic and behavioristic hurdles about animal 
consciousness, one could generate a notion of 
happiness and unhappiness for different sorts 
of animals in terms of whether or not they 
were in a position to fulfill their telos, or 
to engage in those activities whose infringe­
ment or thwarting matter most to them. [2] 
It is perhaps not surprising, though 
certainly disappointing, that this concept 
should be radically misunderstood by signifi­
cant segments of both sides of the debate on 
genetic engineering of agricultural animals. 
While my own position on the relevance of 
telos to genetic engineering is laid out 
fully in a forthcoming article, a version 
of which I gave as a keynote speech to the 
First International Conference on Genetic 
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Engineering of Agricultural Animals in Sep­
tember, 1985, at the University of Californ­
ia, Davis,[3] I should like briefly to com­
ment on what I take to be serious miscon-­
structions of the concept, at least as I USE' 
it. 
'!he scientists, quoted by Dr. Fox, who 
see the concept of telos as "mystical" are 
seriously in error. Their view is as much 
off the mark and in the same way as those 
scientists earlier this century who sought to 
eliminate teleological explanation from bio­
logy. Given the mechanistic bias of mcx:1ern 
biology, as well as the unfortunate tendency 
of many earlier thinkers to equate teleology 
with consciously designed purpose and this 
with Divine Plan, one can understand such 
reservations. After all, the suggestion that 
lakes freeze from the top down in order to 
protect the fish is indeed mystical, reli­
gious ideology. On the other hand, those who 
deny that adrenalin is released in order to 
alert the body to fight or flight, or that 
the immune system exists to fight infection, 
or that there is a pigness to a pig and a 
dogness to a dog bespeak a mischievous, reli­
giously overzealous ideology of their own, 
equally absurd and dogmatic. Scientists and 
philosophers like Sommerhoff, Wiener, Braith­
waite, and Nagel have shown long ago that 
there is nothing inherently problematic about 
teleological explanations, and biological 
sciences as diverse as taxonomy, ethology, 
evolutionary theory, veterinary medicine, 
genetics, and so on have presupposed the 
existence of kinds of animals. To deny ar-
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ticulatable, discoverable, common features 
among pigs or dogs is surely not good sci­
ence; in fact, taking such a claim seriously 
would effectively make all of the above sci­
ences impossible~ If we keep fish but not 
mice in bowls of water, if we heep manure on 
our plants but not on our cats to help them 
.grow, if we walk our dogs but not our lichen, 
we have presupposed differences in telos. 
None of this is mystical nor requires invok­
ing the Deity; evolution will do. 
On the other hand, when Fox asks, "Is 
not the unique genetic make-up· of species-­
their telos--to be respected and worthy of 
noral consideration?", he is guilty of a 
serious ambiguity with great potential· for 
mischief. In my own writing on animal 
rights, I have argued that given an animal's 
telos, it is prima facie wrong to infringe 
upon it. Critics of genetic engineering, 
however, sometimes suggest that the telos 
itself ·is inviolable, that it is wrong to 
change it, rather than violate the fundamen­
tal animal interests which constitute it. 
This surely cannot be correct. Suppose that 
one can change a telos, Tl, by breeding, 
natural selection, genetic engineering, or 
whatever to T2, so that animals which have 
the new telos are less prone than their pre­
decessors to certain diseases or injuries or 
predators. To take a fanciful example, sup­
pose that one changed the genome of a grazing 
animal forced to live in a limited forage 
environment, so that it could now photosyn­
thesize its food as well as graze. Unknown 
environmental considerations aside, and as­
suming this change had no harmful or painful 
effects on the animal, surely such a change 
would not in and of itself be wrong. On my 
view, then, it is only wrong to change a 
telos if the individual animals of that sort 
are likely to be nore unhappy or suffer nore 
after the change than before. 
In Short, then, one cannot argue that 
because it is wrong to violate the various 
aspects of a certain animal's telos given the 
telos, it is therefore wrong to change the 
telos. This is true only if the change in 
the telos is likely to engender nore unhappi­
ness in the animals, given the environment in 
which they live, than would have accrued to 
them before. What respect for telos does is 
give us a way of measuring the rightness or 
wrongness of our actions vis ~ vis the indi­
vidual animals falling under the telos; it 
does not tell us that we cannot change the 
characteristics of the type in question, 
especially if the animals falling under the 
new type are less likely to suffer. Given 
the rules of chess, one cannot nove the cast­
le diagonally; that tells us nothing about 
whether we ought to invent a new game with a 
new set of rules in which one can so nove. 
On the other hand, critics like Fox do 
have a powerful point • Given the human pur­
poses of productivity and efficiency to which 
genetic engineering (or telos changing) of 
animals is likely to be aimed, in all proba­
bility, such changes in telos are unlikely to 
make the animals better off. Scientists 
attempting to engineer oversized animals like 
chickens are already reporting joint prob­
lems, since the joint carmot bear the addi-' 
tional weight. Thus, the engineering of 
telos for increased size is likely to lead to 
a new sort of suffering, which would probably 
be of little concern to producers as long as 
it didn't impair efficiency. In other words, 
if the increasing weight gain economically 
outweighed the economic effects (if any) of 
painful joints, it is likely that this perni­
cious result to the animal would be ignored. 
Thus, given the economic basis of animal 
engineering, it is plausible that one whose 
concern is the happiness of .animals should 
show healthy skepticism about such te10s 
manipulation, for in fact, it is probably 
likely to generate nore harm than good for 
the animals. But this is very different from 
saying that changing telos is in principle 
wrong. Indeed, if public awareness of and 
distress over the suffering of animals con­
tinues to grow, it is very possible that 
modification of telos could turn into a p0w­
erful tool for alleviating that suffering, 
rather than just a short cut to further ex­
ploitation. For example, one could concen­
trate on engineering animals which are happy 
in the environments in which we put them. 
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